Introduction and Background
A classic problem in the theory of international trade, going back to John Stuart Mill (1844, pp. 41-3) , is that of showing that if one country makes a unilateral transfer of funds to another, not only will it lose by the amount of the transfer, but it will also suffer a "secondary burden" of worsened terms of trade, i.e., lower prices of its exports relative to its imports. This is known as the "classical transfer problem." Mill's thesis was disputed by Ohlin (1928 Ohlin ( , 1929 but defended by Keynes (1929 Keynes ( , 1930 in their debate on the effects of the German reparations payments to the Allied Powers after the First World War.
In Samuelson's (1952 Samuelson's ( , 1954 classic treatment the idealization was used (as a way of taking account of transport costs) that commodities deteriorated en route from one country to another. In Chipman (1974) I replaced this by the idealization introduced by Taussig (1927) of nontraded goods, assuming traded goods to be tradable with zero transport costs. In Chipman (1989) I took up the particular case of constant costs in production (the basic assumption made by Mill) , in a model in which each of the two countries produces an export good and a nontradable good with a single factor of production (say labor), but relies on imports for the remaining good. I used the concept of a "tradeutility function" developed in Chipman (1979 Chipman ( , 1981 , in which country k's trade utility is defined as a function,Û k (z k 1 , z k 2 ), of its "trades" (import quantity if positive, export quantity if negative), and the concept of country k's tradedemand function z k =ĥ k (p 1 , p 2 , D k ), expressed as a function of the the prices of the two tradables and of the deficit in its balance of payments on current account (this function being generated by maximization of the trade-utility function subject to the balance-of-payments constraint
Assuming that country 1 makes a transfer of T = −D 1 = D 2 (expressed in a common currency unit) to country 2, the condition for the transfer to worsen the paying country's terms of trade p 1 /p 2 is the following generalization of Samuelson's (1952 Samuelson's ( , 1954 well-known condition:
The hypothesis of constant costs implies that the prices of goods produced in country k satisfy p k /p 
to be satisfied (where y k j is the output of commodity j in country k and l k is country k's endowment of labor), the trade-demand functions for country k were shown in Chipman (1989) (see also Chipman, 1981) to have the form
is country k's ordinary (Marshallian) demand function for commodity j, and Y k is country k's national income. Accordingly, the partial derivatives in (1.1) evaluate to
Thus, the inequality (1.1) becomes Mundell, 1960 1 , which is the weak counterpart of Samuelson's condition. It is clearly of greater interest, however, to characterize countries' indirect and direct utility functions which generate demand functions that satisfy (1.5). The equality in (1.5) corresponds-as far as commodity 2 is concerned-to Keynes's dictum (1929, p. 2) : "If $1 is taken from you and given to me and I choose to increase my consumption of precisely the same goods as those of which you are compelled to diminish yours, there is no Transfer Problem." In this spirit we may apply the same reasoning to the other tradable commodity.
To this end let us first note that (1.4) is equivalent to the inequality
This follows from differentiation of the budget identities p 1ĥ
whence (1.6) follows from (1.1) and (1.3). From the same reasoning as above we may adopt the stronger sufficient conditions
∂Y 2 and
We shall therefore explore the consequences of adopting the assumptions
( 1.8) This is the object of the present paper. The analysis relies heavily on the treatment of the integrability problem given in Chipman and Moore (1990) , which in turn relies on the basic results of Samuelson (1950) , McKenzie (1957) , and Hurwicz and Uzawa (1971) . It will be assumed throughout that countries' preferences are aggregable and locally insatiable and that demand and utility functions are continuously differentiable.
Characterization of Indirect Utility Functions Representing the Countries' Preferences
Theorem 1. Conditions (1.8) imply that the indirect utility function of the consumers in each country k has the form
and where A k is convex and positively homogeneous of degree 0, and B is convex and positively homogeneous of degree 1, and has the form
, where a > 0, C 0 is concave and positively homogeneous of degree 1, and θ 0 > 0, θ 3 > 0, and θ 0 + θ 3 = 1.
Proof: Since (1. 
Integrating these equations we obtain for some functions ϕ
From the budget equation
From the positive homogeneity of degree 0 of each h
3 ) are positively homogeneous of degree 0 and −1 respectively, for i = 1, 2, 3.
We denote the Slutsky terms by
From (2.2) and (2.3) we obtain
In particular, since from (2.2) we have ∂ψ i /∂p k 3 = 0 for i = 1, 2, it follows from (2.7) that ∂ψ 3 /∂p i = 0 for i = 1, 2, hence ψ k 3 , and therefore p
, is independent of p 1 and p 2 ; 2 thus we have
where 0 < θ 3 < 1 since, as we have assumed, the nontradable is a normal good in both countries. Thus we have
Having obtained the above properties of the demand functions, let us now integrate them to obtain the corresponding indirect utility functions for k = 1, 2 (cf. Chipman & Moore 1990, pp. 105-9) . First, in view of the second equation of (2.7), there exists a twice-differentiable function Ψ(p 1 , p 2 , p k 3 ) satisfying the differential equation
2 While, to be sure, the dependency relation p
k holds in this model, we are here limiting ourselves to examining the properties of demand functions satisfying (1.8) where the independent variables are free to vary independently subject to those assumptions, hence in this sense p k 3 is independent of (p 1 , p 2 ).
we verify that
Now consider the system of partial differential equations
We verify from (2.10) and the first equation of (2.7) that Chipman & Moore 1990, pp. 106-7) . Thus the system (2.12) has a solution.
Finally, let us define the function (2.1), where
We verify from (2.12) and (2.11) that
hence by Antonelli's partial differential equation (1886, p. 17; 1971, p. 349, equation (24) )
Therefore V k is an indirect utility function representing country k's preferences.
Being an indirect utility function, V k must be convex in p k and positively homogeneous of degree 0 in (p k , Y k ). Consequently, A k (p k ) must be convex and positively homogeneous of degree 0 and B(p k ) must be convex and positively homogeneous of degree −1. Now from (2.9) and (2.7) we have
= 0 for i = 1, 2, (2.13) From (2.9) and (2.8) we have
Integrating (2.14) and taking account of (2.13) and the condition ∂Ψ/∂p i = ψ i for i = 1, 2 from (2.9), we obtain
Defining the "cost-of-living function"
it follows from (2.15) that
where a = exp{α} and F (p 1 , p 2 ) = exp{Φ(p 1 , p 2 )}.
Since C must be concave and positively homogeneous of degree 1 it follows that F must be positively homogeneous of degree θ 0 = 1 − θ 3 < 1. Defining the function
it follows from (2.16) that C 0 is positively homogeneous of degree 1. Thus, (2.17) may be written as
where θ 0 + θ 3 = 1. (2.19)
Characterization of Direct Utility Function Representing a Country' Homothetic Preferences
Since in this section I shall build on the result of the previous section, in order to economize on notation I shall deal with a single country and dispense with the k superscripts.
When an indirect utility function V (p, Y ) has the Antonelli-Nataf-Gorman form (2.1), it is in general not possible to express its dual direct utility function U (x) in an explicit closed form. This is, however, possible in the special case in which preferences are homothetic, hence ϕ i (p 1 , p 2 , p 3 ) = 0 and thus A(p) = 0, so that (2.1) becomes
The reason for this is that when preferences are homothetic and represented by a homogeneous-of-degree-1 utility function, this utility function and the above-defined cost-of-living function are dual to one another, just as the homogeneous-of-degree-1 production function and minimum-unit-cost function are dual to one another. Let us explore this duality relationship.
Let the vector-valued demand function h(p, Y ) (where p is the price vector and Y is income) be generated by maximizing a homogeneous-of-degree-1 utility function
. By definition of an indirect utility function,
which defines the cost-of-living function
The marginal utility of income is then
Now if expenditure p·x is minimized subject to U (x) u, a necessary condition (for an interior solution) is that
where c = C(p). This is analogous to the condition that the marginal physical productivity of factor i in a particular industry be equal to the ratio of the ith factor rental to the price of the industry's product. In production duality, the analogous condition on the minimum-unit-cost function states that the ith partial derivative of the cost function is equal to the ratio of the ith input to the output. The counterpart of this relation is the condition
This follows from Antonelli's partial differential equation according to which
First, the following general lemma on homogeneous-of-degree-1 utility functions will be established.
Lemma. Let U (x) = U (x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x n ) be a concave utility function which is positively homogeneous of degree 1; let x = h(p, Y ) be the demand function which maximizes U (x) subject to the budget constraint p · x Y , and let
be the corresponding indirect utility function; and let C(p) = 1/V (p, 1) be the "cost-of-living function." Then for any x, p maximizes C(p) subject to the same budget constraint. Further,
and given any concave and positively homogeneous-of-degree-1 function C(p), letting p = q(x, Y ) be the function that maximizes C(p) subject to the above budget constraint, and letting
Proof: The idea of the proof is indicated in the following chart:
On the left we have the well-known duality between utility maximization subject to a budget constraint and expenditure-minimization subject to a standard-of-living constraint (cf. Debreu 1959, pp. 68-71) . On the right we have the same duality with C(p) taking the place of U (x). On the bottom we have the duality theorem of Shephard (1953 Shephard ( , 1970 and Uzawa (1964 ) (see also Fuss & McFadden 1978 )-specialized to the case of homogeneous functionswhere U (x) corresponds to the production function and C(p) to the minimumunit-cost function of production theory. (For this specialization see Chipman 1987, p. 924, Theorem 3, showing 
1}.) From these three dualities we obtain the duality (equivalence) between the top two problems shown in the chart.
The cost-of-living function C(p) coincides with the usual expenditure function E(p, u) = min x {p · x | U (x) u} evaluated at u = 1, as well as with the reciprocal of the marginal utility of income
The maximization of the cost of living in the statement of the above lemma should not of course be interpreted as a maximization on the part of consumers, but rather as a maximization on the part of Nature with respect to the prices, with the quantities taken as fixed.
5 Alternatively, we may simply refrain from giving this problem an economic interpretation and consider it purely as a mathematical problem.
Theorem 2. If preferences in both countries are homothetic, (1.8) implies that the countries' utility functions have the form
where U 0 is concave and positively homogeneous of degree 1. Thus, they are additively separable as between the tradable commodities and the nontradable commodity.
Proof: We shall start by maximizing the given utility function (3.3) with respect to the quantities subject to the budget constraint (with fixed prices) and derive the cost-of-living function, then reverse the steps and maximize the cost-of-living function with respect to the prices subject to the budget constraint (with fixed quantities) and recover the utility function. Maximizing (3.3) subject to the budget constraint 3 i=1 p i x i Y , we obtain the necessary conditions
from which it follows that
thus obtaining a "sub-demand function" for commodity 3. Since from (3.4) we have
if we maximize U 0 (x 1 , x 2 ) subject to (3.5) we then obtain sub-demand functions for commodities 1 and 2 which we denote
5 I owe to Norman Schofield the observation that this analogy of the economic problem to a game between the Consumer and Nature was pointed out by von Neumann (1938; 1945, p. 5 ); see also Arrow & Debreu (1954, p. 285) .
The cost-of-living function therefore becomes, from (3.2),
Let us now reverse the previous steps and start with a cost-of-living function
where C 0 (p 1 , p 2 ) is concave and positively homogeneous of degree 1, and maximize (3.7) subject to the constraint
The steps go through precisely as before. We arrive at the functions p i =q i (x 1 , x 2 , θ 0 Y ) (i = 1, 2), p 3 =q 3 (p 3 , θ 3 Y ) = θ 3 Y /x 3 , (3.8) the first two of which are obtained by maximizing C 0 (p 1 , p 2 ) subject to x 1 p 1 + x 2 p 2 θ 0 Y . In accordance with the Lemma we define U (x) = C[q(x, 1)] −1 , or U (x 1 , x 2 , x 3 ) = C q 1 (x 1 , x 2 , θ 0 ),q 2 (x 1 , x 2 , θ 0 ), θ 3 /x 3 −1 = aC 0 q 1 (x 1 , x 2 , θ 0 ),q 2 (x 1 , x 2 , θ 0 ) and U 0 (x 1 , x 2 ) = C 0 q 1 (x 1 , x 2 , θ 0 ),q 1 (x 1 , x 2 , θ 0 ) −1 .
Thus we have recovered the original utility function. The assumption that preferences in the two countries are homothetic, and that the effect of a change in income on demand for either tradable good is the same in the two countries (as specified by (1.8)), has led to the conclusion that the two countries have identical preferences of the form (3.3). This may be expressed by saying that the countries' preferences are additively separable as between the tradables and the nontradable, since there exists a monotone increasing transformation of the function U of (3.3) (namely log U ) which is of the additively separable form: log U (x 1 , x 2 , x 3 ) = θ 0 log U 0 (x 1 , x 2 ) + θ 3 log x 3 .
